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Legislation, Litigation and Liability
A J See1
ABSTRACT
Safety and health at work is about people. It is about people who plan for
work, organise work and perform work. It is about those who come in
contact with the workplace and those who are responsible for the
workplace.
There are wider ranging safety and health obligations that are imposed
on the industry stakeholders that span all phases of the production
process. In all cases, those responsible for discharging the obligations
must ask the questions: Is what we propose safe?, can it be done safer?
and are we sure?
What we learn from recent legal cases before the courts is that it is
essential that all stakeholders work together in a collaborative way when
discharging these obligations.
Safety and health at work cannot become an issue that is viewed only
through the eyes of a single stakeholder group. The reason for this is
quite simple. The interrelatedness of the responsibilities that are imposed
on each of the stakeholder groups, means that the performance based
legislation simply wont work, where an active model of communication
and consultation is not in place.
INTRODUCTION
Australian workplace health and safety law has been the subject
of much debate over the past several decades. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, many of the state based mining and non-mining
laws were recast with a view to making health and safety a
fundamental part of the production process.
Often the language of those involved in that debate spoke of
pre-Robens versus post Robens legislation, with the predominant
view being that performance based legislation in the style
advocated by Lord Robens (Safety and Health at Work, 1972),
was the panacea for ensuring health and safety at work. That is,
what was required was legislating for outcomes, not prescribing
the way in which safety was to be achieved.
But performance based legislation may not, in itself, be always
that easy to implement.
While Australia’s safety and health laws are arguably among
the best in the world, there nonetheless remains a good deal of
debate as to how the obligations of the individual stakeholders
should be carried out. This paper seeks to highlight some of the
issues that are pertinent to the debate, through an examination of
some recent case law. The analysis takes place not for the
purposes of examining the behaviour of the parties, but more to
gain a better insight into the nature of the issues that form the
backdrop to the potential legislation, litigation and liability that
faces the coal mine operator.
THE LEGISLATIVE BACKDROP
Understanding the obligations of the coal
operator and the site senior executive
The starting point for any analysis of this type must be the
current legislative backdrop and what I intend to do is to consider
this backdrop from a Queenslander’s perspective.
The Queensland Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 has
two objectives, to protect the safety and health of persons at coal
mines and persons who may be affected by coal mining
operations and to require that the risk of injury or illness to any
person resulting from coal mining operations be at an acceptable
level (Section 6).
The primary obligations imposed on the coal mine operator
focus on the place of work, the plant and the systems and people
and it is through the role of the site senior executive that these
obligations are discharged.
The most critical activity for the site senior executive is to
ensure on behalf of the operator, that it develops and implements
a safety and health management system for the mine and that it is
supported by a management structure that will ensure that the
system works.
The importance of having an effective management structure is
made quite clear when one reflects on some of what the safety
and health management system needs to do. For example, the
system (Section 62) must:
• define the coal mine operator’s safety and health policy;
• contain a plan to implement the coal mine operator’s safety
and health policy;
• state how the coal mine operator intends to develop the
capabilities and support mechanisms necessary to achieve the
policy; and
• include principal hazard management plans and standard
operating provisions.
Yet the management structure of the operating company is not
alone when it comes to the effective implementation of some of
these responsibilities. Under Queensland law, the legislature has
placed significant importance on the tri-partite responsibilities of
all of the industry partners and this is evident in the roles given to
the Safety and Health Council (Part 6), the Industry (Part 7) and
Site (Part 8) Health and Safety Representatives.
The point to be made is that the legislative arrangements for the
coal mine operator are complex and involve many stakeholders.
The following two case studies have been selected to
demonstrate these complexities.
A CONSIDERATION OF THE OBLIGATIONS IN
THE CASE OF GRETLEY
Background
On 14 November 1996, four mine workers at the Gretley
Colliery were killed, when the continuous miner they were
operating holed into abandoned workings of the Young Wallsend
Colliery (YWC) causing a sudden inrush of water. Such was the
force of the inrush that the 45 tonne continuous miner was
moved 20 metres inbye and found after the accident, positioned
diagonally across the heading.
As a result of the fatalities and following a judicial inquiry
before the Court of Coal Mines Regulation and a coroner’s
inquest, 52 charges were brought against the corporate
defendants, the Newcastle Wallsend Coal Company Pty Limited
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A central factor in the disaster was that the south east
boundaries of the old workings were always 100 metres or
more closer to the proposed mining activity boundaries for
50/51 panel than the official mine plans for the colliery were
depicting at all relevant times.
(NWCC) and its parent company Oakbridge Pty Limited
(Oakbridge), under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983
(NSW) Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales
(IRC, 2004). An additional 24 charges of a similar nature were
brought against eight personal defendants.
Some eight years later, the health and safety community are
now considering the implications of Gretley following the
decision handed down by the Industrial Relations Commission of
New South Wales in Court Session on 9 August last year.
In the case of the corporate defendants, at issue was whether
they had discharged their statutory obligation under ss 15 and 16
of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983, by ensuring the
health safety and welfare of their employees and those involved
in the employer’s undertaking.
In assessing the corporate defendants’ obligations, the
prosecutors brought three different types of charges against the
corporations. These were:
• planning, research and assessment charges relating to events
that had occurred between 22 March 1994 and 14 November
1996;
• system of work charges relating to events that had occurred
between 16 September 1996 and 13 November 1996; and
• night shift charges, relating to events that had occurred on 13
and 14 November 1996.
Planning, research and assessment charge
The planning research and assessment charges as their name
indicates relate to the original planning undertaken by the
corporations prior to commencing the mining operation. These
charges cover the time period from when NWCC signed the
relevant coal lease with the New South Wales Department of
Mineral Resources up and until the time of the accident.
The essential thrust of these charges was that it was alleged
that the corporate defendants failed to undertake planning by
way of properly researching available sources and information
on the location and extent of YWC old workings.
Relevant statutory obligations
There are several relevant statutory obligations that must be
understood, before an analysis of the planning charges takes
place.
Firstly, the mine manager had a statutory responsibility under
Section 8(2) (a) of the Coal Mines Regulation (Methods and
Systems of Working – Underground Mines) 1984 to take such
steps as may be necessary to ensure that he or she is at all times
in possession of such information as would indicate or tend to
indicate the presence of any disused excavations or workings, in
the vicinity where work is being carried on or proposed to be
carried on.
Secondly, the mine manager is also obliged under Section
37(2) of the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1982 that he or she will
take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that at all times the
manager is in possession of all available information relevant to
the behaviour of strata surrounding the mine and its relationship
to the safe working of the mine and all available information
regarding disused excavations or workings in the vicinity of the
mine.
Finally, in the case of the mine surveyor, the duties under
Section 8 (g) of the Coal Mines Survey and Plan Regulation
1984, include the requirement that where a mine surveyor has
any doubt as to the accuracy of any plans, drawings or sections
of the mine not prepared by the mine surveyor, or under the
supervision of the mine surveyor, which may have an effect upon
the working and operation of the mine or the safety of persons at
the mine, that the mine surveyor shall draw such doubt to the
attention of the manager of the mine.
Let us consider these obligations within the context of the facts
of the case.
The record tracings
At issue in relation to the planning, research and assessment
charges was the reliability of the record tracings that were held
by the Department of Mineral Resources. The record tracings
(RT 523) were made up of three sheets.
The first sheet, Sheet 1, was headed ‘Plan Shewing Young
Wallsend Coal Workings’ and was copied from the colliery plan
at the coal field office in 1892. Sheet 1 contained two sets of
workings that were depicted separately by black and red ink.
According to Staunton J (IRC, 2004), the two sets of workings
appear to overlay each other, particularly in the north western
and south eastern boundaries, so much so that:
any person looking at RT 523 Sheet 1 could not
help but wonder as to the precise import of the
red and black workings and their relationship to
each other (at IRC, 2004, page 388).
By contrast, Sheets 2 and 3 came into existence some time
around 1980 and were created according to a departmental
Minute Paper written at the time:
due to the fact that the workings of both seams
that directly overlay each other and were shown
by differing colours on the one plan of
abandonment , as well as the poor condition of
the plan, that a separate tracing of each working
had to be made (at IRC, 2004, page 389).
The purpose of Sheets 2 and 3 was to separate the red and
black mine workings depicted on Sheet 1, with the bottom seam
workings appearing to be represented in Sheet 2 and the top
seam workings being reproduced in Sheet 3.
The problem that appeared to arise as a consequence of the
reproductions of these workings was that:
The inaccuracy of these maps proved fatal to the company and
it was the preferred view of at least one witness that it was more
than likely that the drawings related to the workings of the upper
seam only.
According to Staunton J, the defendants failed to do research
and planning properly, because they failed to independently and
objectively consider anomalies in Sheet 1 that Sheets 2 and 3
didn’t resolve.
In this respect there are several issues that should be noted.
Firstly the court accepted the evidence of an expert witness that
there were basic surveying principles ignored by the surveyor,
when he was confronted with the glaring inconsistencies
identified in Sheets 2 and 3.
Secondly, the court was of the view that against that backdrop,
the defendants should have sought additional information from
the department, such as from the Abandonment Register to
clarify the extent of the workings. There was no evidence of this
taking place.
Finally, an independent drilling program undertaken by the
defendant established that the purported Borehole Seam
workings in the south-eastern direction as depicted in Sheet 2,
did not exist as had been depicted.
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whoever created them interpreted Sheet 1 in a particular
way. That is, the red and black workings depicted as
superimposed on each other in Sheet 1 had been separated
out and depicted as stand alone workings in two different
seams, vertically 18 metres apart (at IRC, 2004, page 401).
To summarise the court held that the:
Defendants did not critically scrutinise Sheets 2
and 3 seeking background information to satisfy
themselves about that information causing Sheets
2 and 3 to be depicted the way they were.
Furthermore, no filed notes were made of surveys,
and no abandonment plan of YWC was filed;
therefore there was no certainty of the extent as to
the continuation of old workings. This was
actually confirmed by an independent drilling
report throwing doubt onto the whole situation.
It was the court’s view that the defendant’s reliance on Sheets
2 and 3 as the basis for planning mining at Gretley, especially in
50/51 panel created a real and potential risk to the health and
safety of its employees working in that panel.
Further derivative planning and research charges
What is important to observe in the Gretley analysis, is the
reliance by the Crown prosecutor on derivative charges. That is,
further charges that are brought about derived from an initial
alleged failure. While the court recognised that the prosecutor
was technically correct in casting the charges this way, his
Honour was of the view that such a process could on occasions
be unnecessarily duplicitous.
That being said, the court held the corporate defendants liable
for the following derivative charges stemming from their failure
to undertake planning and research:
1. the defendant’s failure to accurately depict the location/
extent of YWC old workings on any mine plans;
2. the defendant’s failure to accurately depict the location/
extent of YWC old workings on the Application submitted
to the Department on the 6 September 1994;
3. the defendant’s failure to accurately depict the
location/extent of YWC old workings on the redrawn plans
forwarded to the Department on the 27 October 1994; and
4. the defendant’s failure to accurately depict the
location/extent of the YWC old workings on the Variation
submitted to the Department on or about 11 August 1995.
Failure to undertake appropriate risk assessment
Another example of planning charges that were dealt with by the
Court related to:
• a failure to plan by way of risk assessment for the
development of 50/51 panel; and
• a failure to carry out an assessment of the risks to the health,
safety and welfare of the employees and mine workers in the
event of an inrush of water and/or dangerous gases.
Despite the contention of the corporate defendants that a risk
assessment process had taken place by the companies when the
original miniwall application was made, the Court was of the
view that such a process was not the same as a documented risk
identification and assessment process that would include a risk
management policy; duties and responsibilities of persons
involved, a risk register and risk action plan.
The Court (IRC, 2004) found that while the Gretley Collieries
Emergency Procedure Document identified clear procedural
steps to be followed at an administrative level once the incident
leading to a decision to evacuate had occurred, there was nothing
in the document that directed the actual employees at the site of
the major incident.
The observation was also made by the Court that there was no
direct evidence received from any witness who worked at the
Gretley mine, as to their knowledge of and reliance upon the
Emergency Procedure Document.
To summarise the above, the scope of the planning charges
were wide ranging and impacted on all aspects of the health and
safety system.
System of work charges
The second type of charges laid against the corporate defendants,
were the system of work charges.
Again while the nature of these charges have as their
foundation the initial failure by the defendants to undertake
effective planning and research, the analysis of the issues did
identify several unique considerations.
Of interest are those aspects of the charges that are
particularised to include:
• a failure to investigate, adequately or at all, Deputies written
and oral reports from 1 November 1996;
• a failure to inform Deputies, the employees and other mine
workers that the Young Wallsend coal workings were full or
water and under a head of pressure; and
• a failure to instruct Deputies, the employees and other mine
workers to be vigilant in looking for signs of water make
whilst working in the panel.
It is worth noting that on three occasions before the accident,
that the Mine Deputy had entered into his statutory reports the
presence of water in the 50/51 panel.
These included:
• 1 November 1996 – nuisance accumulation of water;
• 4 November 1996 – large amount of nuisance water; and
• 13 November 1996 – coal seam is giving out considerable
amount of water seepage at face of C heading.
While the court did not conclude that these reports were
extraordinary in themselves, coupled with the fact that the
defendants were relying on inaccurate mine plans created a
situation of far more significance.
The court also heard evidence of a discussion held between the
mine surveyor and the Mines Subsidence Board several weeks
before the accident, when the surveyor was advised that:
we were having a water management problem
and management wanted to know where these
plans were or the accuracy of the plans.
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The court dealt with these derivative charges together and
found the defendant’s guilty on each occasion, because
once established that the defendant failed to accurately
depict the YWC old workings on the initial mine plan of
Gretley, they would continue to do so in all future mine
plans subsequently produced by Gretley.
His Honour stated:
Given the nature of the risk, an adequate risk assessment
would have encompassed much more than acknowledging
the presence of the old workings and the intention to leave a
barrier. In identifying risks as being the risk of inrush from
water and/or dangerous gases, the consequences of such
a risk would have been identified as death or injury to
workers. This would have highlighted as a risk prevention
strategy the need to ensure that the depiction of the Young
Wallsend old workings could be relied upon with question as
to their accuracy (at 550).
Additional evidence was given as to the presence of a
contractor’s hydraulic drill rig that may have been brought in for
drilling ahead in the 50/51 panel either scheduled for the day or
the following day of the disaster.
The conclusions of the Court in relation to these charges were
that the system of work charge is derivative in nature as it stems
directly from the defendants’ failure to properly research and
assess the location and extent of the YWC old workings.
The Court held that although the mine workers knew that they
were working towards old workings where they thought they
were, the court held that the mine managers and workers should
have been made fully aware of the YWC old workings. As a
consequence, the defendants were found guilty of the system of
work charges.
Night shift charges
The final category of charges related to the time period for the
night shift of 11.30 pm 13 November 1996 until 7.30 am on
14 November 1996.
The night shift charges were particularised in the exact same
terms as the system of work charges.
Again in the case of the night shift charges, the majority of the
particularised failures alleged, derived from the defendant’s
primary failure to properly research the location and extent of the
Young Wallsend old workings.
While according to the Court these charges relied on differing
factual particulars or differing aspect of primary fact in order to
establish the basis of the alleged offence, for predominantly the
same reasons and conclusions the majority of the failures as
particularised were proven.
Defences under Section 53 of the OHS Act
Did the defendants do all that was reasonably
practicable?
A defence under Section 53(a) requires the defendant to meet the
objective test as to whether it was reasonably practicable for the
defendant to have complied with the Act. In WorkCover
Authority of NSW (Inspector Byer) v Cleary Bros (Bombo) Pty
Ltd (2001) 110 IR 182 at 204, Walton J said that in assessing the
merits of whether a defendant had done all that is reasonably
practicable, requires a:
balancing of the nature, likelihood and gravity of
the risk to safety occasioning the offence with the
costs, difficulty and trouble necessary to avert
the risk.
In that respect the corporate defence failed.
Staunton J found that it was always reasonably practicable for
the defendants to:
• plan by way of risk assessment for the development of 50/51
panel;
• carry out an assessment of the risks to the health, safety and
welfare of the employees and mine workers in the event of an
inrush of water and/or dangerous gases;
• plan by means of test drilling to establish the location and the
extent of the Young Wallsend coal workings, prior to the
development of the 50/51 panel;
• allow or not, as the case may be the operation and use of the
continuous miner at the face of ‘C’ heading;
• prevent mining operations in the area of 50/51 panel where it
had failed to ascertain the location and extent of the Young
Wallsend coal workings;
• ensure that there was an adequate barrier between where the
employees were working and the Young Wallsend coal
workings;
• test drill, or cause test drilling to be performed to locate
Young Wallsend coal workings;
• inform deputies, the employees and other mine workers that
50/51 panel was heading towards the Young Wallsend coal
workings;
• inform deputies, the employees and other mine workers that
the Young Wallsend coal workings were full of water and
under a head of pressure; and
• instruct deputies, the employees and other mine workers to
be vigilant in looking for signs of water make whilst working
in 50/51 panel.
Defence that the corporation had no control
The second prong of the defence at Section 53(b) provides that it
shall be a defence to any proceedings for the person to prove
that:
(b) the commission of the offence was due to
causes over which the person had no
control and against the happening of which
it was impracticable for the person to make
provision.
The defendants sought a defence under this head on the basis
that the existence and availability of information on the location
and extent of the Young Wallsend Coal workings was not within
the control of the defendants.
The court rejected that submission. It held that with the
exception of one file, all other relevant information that went to
researching the location and extent of the Young Wallsend Coal
old workings was within the control of the defendants, in that it
was readily accessible by them. Firstly, the Court observed that
the defendants had the resources and personnel to enable them to
carry out that task. Secondly, however, the Court was of the view
that while it was correct for the defendants to assert that the
errors made by the Department of Mineral Resources were not
under the control of the defendants, that such a view missed the
point.
Individual defendant’s liability
The decision in Gretley has caused some degree of consternation
among those persons engaged within the mining industry who
hold statutory appointments.
The actions commenced against the eight personal defendants
comes about by virtue of Section 50(1) of the Occupational
Health and Safety Act 1983, that states:
(1) Where a corporation contravenes, whether by
act or omission any provision of this Act or the
regulations, each director of the corporation,
and each person concerned in the management of
the corporation, shall be deemed to have
contravened the same provision unless he or she
satisfies the court that…
(b) he or she was not in a position to influence
the conduct of the corporation in relation
to its contravention of the provision, or
146 Brisbane, QLD, 26 - 28 April 2005 Coal2005 Conference
A J SEE
The defendants were not being held liable for the errors
made by the department, but for their failure to properly
research the location and extent of the workings and the
consequences that flowed as a result.
(c) he or she, being in such a position used all
due diligence to prevent the contravention
by the corporation.
The central issue for the court to determine was whether the
individual defendants were concerned with the management of
the corporation beyond a reasonable doubt, and if so did they
exercise due diligence to prevent contravention of the Act.
It was the view of Staunton J, that the decision-making
authority and the inherent responsibility of the employee must
affect the whole corporation or a substantial part of the
corporation, for the employee to be ‘concerned in the
management of the corporation’. There must be more than
participation in the activities relevant to the responsibility and
work undertaken at the mine.
Were the personal defendants concerned in the
management of the corporation?
In the case of the Gretley mine manager he was appointed as a
general mine manager as well as a statutory mine manager. The
significance of this according to the court, was the corporate title
intended to encompass a broader range of duties associated with
the total management of the business, far more than just the
statutory function.
For example, there was evidence of the general mine
managers’ roles in the total management of the corporation. He
attended and participated in meetings within the broader
management structure of the corporate parent Oakbridge, and as
part of that role was involved in the marketing, financial,
direction and policy decisions of the corporate parent.
In addition, the Court heard that the general mine managers at
Gretley implemented and oversaw the corporate safety meetings
of Oakbridge, forming complex safety policies at various
Oakbridge mines, including Gretley.
All of these responsibilities that were inherent in the role of
the general mine manager, provided evidence that the position
was one that was concerned with the management of the
corporation. Yet that in itself is insufficient to establish a
personal defendant. To do so requires a personal responsibility in
the management of the corporation that includes some practical
connection with the causal act or omission of the corporation.
Role of surveyor
In determining whether the Gretley mine surveyor was
concerned with the management of the corporation, the court
considered the duties of the surveyor as contained in Clause 8 of
the Coal Mines Regulation (Survey and Plan) Regulation 1984.
Particularly relevant were the duties located at subclauses (c),
(f) and (g) as follows:
(c) draw attention of mines’ employees or
officials to any neglect or deviation from
centres, marks, or instructions given, and
shall report to the manager of the mine any
deviation considered by the mine surveyor
excessive or outside deviation limits set by
the manager…
(f) prepare, or supervise preparation of all
plans, drawings and sections required to
be prepared or kept by this Regulation or
Surveying and Drafting Instructions and
shall certify the accuracy of all such plans,
drawings and sections in writing thereon
(g) where the mine surveyor has any doubt as
to the accuracy of any plans, drawings or
sections of the mine not prepared by the
mine surveyor, or under the supervision of
the mine surveyor, which may have an
effect upon the working and operation of
the mine or the safety of persons at the
mine, draw such doubt to the attention of
the manager of the mine.
In terms of the first tranche of the management test, the court
determined that the mine surveyor had certified the accuracy of
the incorrect mine plans. These plans were then utilised in
supporting decisions taken at management level of the
organisation to depict proposed future mining activity and the
extent of current workings, and workings that have been
abandoned.
This was sufficient for the court to determine that Gretley’s
mine surveyor was concerned in the management of the
corporation. The Court was also of the view that the mine
surveyor had a practical connection, through decision making
and advice, between the corporate defendants and the primary
failure of the corporate defendants to properly research the
location and extent of the YWC old workings.
Role of under manager
In determining whether Gretley’s under managers were
concerned with the management of the corporation, the court
looked to the statutory responsibilities of the under manager as
contained within Section 41 of the Coal Mine Regulation Act
1982.
There was no evidence of any delegation of managerial
responsibility by the mine manager to the under managers in
accordance with Section 56 of the Act. In addition, Clause 9 of
the Coal Mines Regulation (Managers and Officials –
Underground Mines) Regulation 1984 causes the under managers
to be responsible for mine safety only to the extent of the under
managers’ jurisdiction. On that basis, the under managers were
not held personally liable.
Due diligence required to avoid contravention of
Section 50
The second prong of determining the case against the personal
defendants once found to be concerned with the management of
the corporation, requires an examination of the due diligence
employed by those persons.
The case of the mine manager
In the case against the mine managers, the court held that
evidence indicates they were in a position to influence the
conduct of corporations regarding the contraventions of NWCC
and Oakbridge already established under s15(1) and s16(1) of the
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983.
It was established that the mine managers did not use all due
diligence to prevent contravention of the Act by either NWCC or
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In other words for an employee to be ‘concerned in the
management of the corporation’ their responsibilities must
go beyond the statutory functions under the Coal Mining
Regulation Act.
In the case of the general mine managers, their practical
connection with the corporate defendant’s failure to
properly research the location and extent of the YWC old
workings was established when they had signed applications
for miniwall approval to the Department of Mineral
Resources, where the application mentioned that the
Borehole Seam workings are ‘full of water’ and ‘don’t pose
a danger to Gretley workings.
Oakbridge. The mine managers signed and approved plans and
applications regarding approved plans of the previous mine
surveyor of Gretley when the original applications were made to
the DMR in 1994 and 1995.
These plans made by the previous mine surveyor incorrectly
depicted on Sheet 3 the presumed old workings of YWC.
Therefore the court held that the mine managers failed to
discharge their statutory responsibilities under Section 37 of the
Act and Part 3 of the Coal Mines Regulation (Methods and
Systems of Working – Underground Mines) Regulation 1984.
In addition, the mine managers advised and were involved in
corporate decision making through their participation in
Oakbridge’s corporate strategic planning meetings regarding
proposed mining activities at Gretley.
The Court found that Section 37 (2)(h) of the Act is quite clear
with respect to the statutory responsibilities of the mine manager.
That person must ensure that he or she possesses all available
information regarding surroundings, the actual mine, and safety.
The court held that it was clear that as the under managers at
Gretley did not know of the extent of the YWC old workings and
the potential for inrush of water, that the mine managers must
have failed in meeting their obligations under the Act.
On this basis, Staunton J held that the mine managers did not
exercise due diligence to prevent the contraventions by NWCC
and Oakbridge occurring.
The case of the Surveyor
In assessing whether the mine surveyor exercise all due
diligence, his Honour stated that by certifying the accuracy of
mine plans relevant to Gretley, that the mine surveyor took on the
liability this invites. According to Staunton J, it was clear that the
mine surveyor did not use all due diligence to research the
correct location and extent of the YWC old workings to prevent
contraventions by NWCC and Oakbridge.
In certifying significantly incorrect mine plans that had been
made before his employment, although the mine surveyor isn’t
liable under the planning, research and assessment charges, he
does incur liability for not exercising due diligence.
The court established that based on such evidence, that it was
apparent that the mine surveyor, being involved in the
management of the corporation, did not exercise due diligence to
prevent NWCC and Oakbridge from contravening sections 15
and 16 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983.
Lessons learnt from Gretley thus far
The ultimate result of Gretley is unlikely to be known for some
time. What is clear though from this potted analysis of the issues
is that the expansive nature of the safety and health
responsibilities under the coal mining safety and health law
cannot be understated. The implications for the coal mine
operator and the statutory delegates such as the site senior
executive are significant.
Consider for example, the implications of the planning
activity, the reliance on departmental supplied mining plans and
the spiralling effect that the inaccuracies of the mine plans
produced on this occasion. Of significance also in this case, is the
impact on the individual statutory appointee, particularly where
that person is concerned with the management of the
corporation.
While no doubt the further appeal against this decision is
likely to produce a similar smorgasbord of issues to consider, the
lesson to be learnt by all stakeholders is the sheer extent and
significance of the mining safety and health management system.
THE GRASSTREES DECISION: A QUESTION OF
INTERPRETATION
By way of contrast and in a much more concise way, I wish to
turn to the issues raised in the case of Construction, Forestry,
Mining and Energy Union v State of Queensland and AngloCoal
(Grasstrees Management) Pty Ltd.
The Grasstrees mine is located near Middlemount in Central
Queensland.
The central issue in the Grasstrees’ dispute was whether the
underground mine required a third shaft in order to comply with
Section 296(1) of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation
2001 (Qld).
Section 296(1) provides:
The site senior executive must ensure the mine has
at least two trafficable entrances (‘escapeways’)
from the surface that are separated in a way that
prevents any reasonably foreseeable event
happening in one of the escapeways affecting the
ability of persons to escape through the other
escapeway
Put simply, did the two present escapeways, one of which was
a ventilation shaft only, have to be separated by a third
escapeway for health and safety purposes in the event of one of
the escapeways being unavailable.
Determining an acceptable level of risk
In considering this question, the Supreme Court of Queensland
turned to a number of fundamental principles. Firstly, what is an
acceptable risk of injury?
Section 29(2) of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999
sets out what is an acceptable level of risk from a mining
operation.
At the heart of this issue, was the applicant’s concern of the
incapacity of the existing system in the case of fire. That is, that a
fire in the intake shaft would contaminate the air by producing
smoke, reducing the oxygen content of the air and producing
carbon monoxide, with the result being that the contaminated air
would inevitably flow through the roadways and the exhaust
shaft.
In assessing this issue, the Court turned to Section 37 of the
Regulation that deals with the requirements for a coal mine’s
safety and health management system, including issues relating
to fire prevention and control, as well as the standard operating
procedures. The legislation makes it clear that a risk of injury
being at an acceptable level is dependant on the risk’s likelihood
and severity.
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The applicant’s case was that the two shafts at the mine,
while trafficable entrances and thereby escapeways, were
not adequately separated because a reasonably foreseeable
event happening in one of the escapeways, could affect the
ability of person to escape through the other escapeway.
In determining whether risk is within acceptable limits,
regard must be had to:
a. the likelihood of injury to a person rising out of the risk;
and
b. the severity of injury or illness.
The case for the applicant was that if the two escapeways in
a mine are not adequately separated, in the event of a fire,
the likelihood of injury to a person arising out of that risk,
and the severity of that injury, are very real.
Determining a reasonably foreseeable event
The real issue for the court to determine was whether the
possibility of a fire down the Grasstrees’ mine shaft was a
reasonably foreseeable event.
McMurdo J held that whether a potential event is an
unacceptable risk depends on the nature and effectiveness of
relevant controls. He said that a fire is an event, but no
unreasonable risk is assumed if recommended controls are
implemented.
It was his Honour’s view that whether a reasonably foreseeable
event is a risk is a subjective test.
In this regard the court scrutinised the specialist evidence from
the Minerals Industry, Safety and Health Centre at the University
of Queensland.
Despite the fact that the court heard evidence that 2000 litres
of fuel burning within the fuel pod would take some 280 minutes
to completely combust and that such a fire would not adversely
affect the ability of persons to exit the mine via the exhaust shaft,
the court nonetheless was of the view that such a risk of injury
for workers at the mine, was foreseeable.
In reaching his view, his Honour considers the application of
the High Court (1980) decision in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt
(1980) 146 CLR 40.
Applying the test in Wyong Shire Council
In that case, the High Court found that:
When we speak of a risk of injury as being
foreseeable, we are not making any statement
as to the probability or improbability of its
occurrence, save that we are implicitly asserting
the risk is not one that is far fetched or fanciful
(at 42).
Despite the fact that the company’s evidence was that the
ignition of fuels within or spilt from the fuel pod could occur
only through a combination of several human and/or mechanical
failures, the Court decided that the event of a fire remained a real
possibility unless safety mechanisms such as welding were
regarded as incapable of failure through human error.
It was his Honour’s view that the transportation of fire burning
fuel through the intake shaft in the mine is a foreseeable event
constituting a risk.
McMurdo J, stated:
The fact that the applicant’s interpretation of
s 296 could require in an individual case, more
than is necessary to achieve an acceptable level
of risk does not necessarily demonstrate that the
interpretation is incorrect. Rather, the fact that
the regulation requires more than is reasonably
necessary in an individual case could reflect
a preference for certainty and for the avoidance
of dangerous conditions from an erroneous
judgment by the mine operator about whether the
mine does represent an acceptable risk (at 48).
Conclusions of the Court
It was the conclusion of the court that a fire in the intake shaft
was a reasonably foreseeable event. Such an event could
contaminate the airways throughout the mine and its exhaust
airway, at least to the extent or requiring the protective
equipment to be worn at all times by a person who was escaping
until that person was safe at the surface. This in turn according to
the Court, had the potential to substantially, rather than
negligibly, affect the utility of the escapeway.
The court concluded that the two entrances at the mine were not
separated as required by Section 296(1) of the Regulation and as a
consequence, the ultimate result on this occasion was that a third
shaft was constructed at a significant cost to the company.
CONCLUSIONS
So what are the conclusions that are to be drawn from all of this?
In the case of Gretley what can be absorbed to the extent that one
can learn from the decision at the present time, is that the
responsibilities and obligations under the law are far reaching,
overlapping and interconnected. The very notion of derivative
charges that takes place as a flow on from an earlier act or
omission shows the unrelenting way that the responsibilities and
liabilities under the law can be determined and prosecutions
pursued.
Gretley also serves as a timely way for all those charged with
statutory obligations to consider the significance of what they do
and their own personal exposures under the law. The Grasstrees
decision on the other hand, shows that the safety and health law
can be open to much debate as it is interpreted for
implementation in the workplace.
What the legislation is based on is an environment of social
partnership between government, industry and unions to forge
common goals within a framework that recognises the
pre-eminence given to safety and health, while maintaining
economic incentives. An outcome based approach to the
legislation assumes that the performance of the parties will take
place in a cooperative fashion.
Perhaps in the scheme of things, to have the courts interpret
the legislation, as a point of last resort is still the better approach
than a system of overly prescriptive regulation. That may be the
case, providing the lessons from the decisions of the court are
built back into the understanding of the parties and that the
intractability of the parties may be softened against an
environment that shows time and time again, the benefits of
consultation and cooperation, rather than conflict and chaos.
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END NOTE FOLLOWING DECISION
11 MARCH 2005
On 11 March 2005, Staunton J handed down his decision in
relation to the penalties in this matter.
Newcastle Wallsend Coal Company and Oakbridge together
were fined $1.46 million, that was moderated downwards based
in accordance with sentencing law.
The mine manager at the time of the accident and the two
other personal defendants were fined $42 000 and $30 000 each
respectively.
In reaching its decision the court considered the scope of the
defendant’s ongoing obligations and the positive cooperation that
has taken place on behalf of the companies.
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